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RECENT DECISIONS
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CORPORATIONS-APPRAISAL STATUTES-TIME WITHIN w HICH DEMAND
FOR APPRAISAL MusT BE MADE-A resolution to merge the corporation in
which plaintiff held shares with defendant corporation was adopted by the shareholders over plaintiff's objection. Eight days later, plaintiff made written demand
on defendant corporation for payment of the fair value of his shares. The statute
required that such demand be made upon the surviving corporation "within twenty
days after the merger .•. was effected," 1 and provided that a merger became
effective upon issuance of a certificate of merger by the Department of State.2
The articles of merger were not promptly filed and the certificate of merger did
not issue until 42 days after the plaintiff's demand was received. The court below
dismissed plaintiff's petition for appointment of appraisers to fix the value of his
shares, construing the phrase, "within twenty days after the merger • . • was
effected," as fixing both the beginning and the end of the period in which demand
must be made. On appeal, held, reversed. Since the statute fixed the ending
date only, pla_intiff was entitled to demand payment of the fair value of his shares
at any time after the shareholders approved the plan of merger and before the
expiration of twenty days after the merger was effected. Duddy v. Conshohocken
Printing Co., (Pa. 1948) 60 A. (2d) 394.
The Pennsylvania statute governing mergers does not require articles of
merger to be filed at any particular time after approval by the shareholders,3 and
the only requirement for notice of filing to dissenting shareholders is that the
corporation "advertise its intention to file articles of merger . . . at least three
days prior to the day on which the articles ... are presented to the Department of
State." 4 If dissenters are required to wait until the filing of the articles before

1
2
8
4

15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) § 2852-908.
Id.§ 2852-906.
Id.§ 2852-901 et seq.
Id§ 2852-904.
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making a demand upon the corporation for the payment of the fair value of their
shares, this right could easily be frustrated by dilatory tactics on the p~rt of the
corporation. Furthermore, the notice required is insufficient to assure dissenters
actual knowledge of the da~e of filing, and even though the corporation does not
delay, shareholders have no convenient means of knowing when the certificate
of merger is issued by the secretary of state. An additional factor supporting the
result in the principal case, although not mentioned by the court, is that by the
Pennsylvania statute, appraisal and payment of fair value is made the exclusive
remedy for dissenting shareholders. 5 Therefore, interpretations should be avoided
that weaken the protection given to minority shareholders by statute in substitution
for rights previously enjoyed by them. 6 Only those qualifications absolutely
essential for the protection of the corporation should condition the dissenting
shareholder's remedy; otherwise he is left without adequate protection. This
necessity is not so great in most states where appraisal is only one of the remedies
afforded the dissenting shareholder.7 Since dilatory practices by striking shareholders may adversely affect underwriting arrangements,8 it is desirable
to limit the time in which the demand may be made by dissenters. However, it
is inconceivable that the corpor3:tion will be subject to greater harassment if this
period is increased by permitting such demands immediately following adoption
of the merger plan, as long as the final date, upon which shareholders' demands
can be made, remains the same. It is of importance to shareholders considering the
merger proposal to know before they act the maximum number of shares for which
fair value must be paid if the merger is approved. Thus, for the benefit of other
shareholders and the corporation, the statute requires that a dissenting shareholder
identify himself by filing a written objection with the corporation prior to or at
the meeting of shareholders at which the plan is submitted.9 On the other hand,
the provision for demand subsequent to approval of the plan is designed to give
the dissenter a period of time in which to determine whether he will retain his
stockholdings in the continuing corporation or take the value thereof.10 Since
this provision was intended for the protection of dissenting shareholders and a
liberal construction of it does not detract from the protection given to the other
shareholders and the corporation, the decision in the principal case seems correct.
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Id.§ 28 52-908, as amended, id. (Supp. 1947) which confers the right to appraisal
upon dissenting shareholders, contains the following in paragraph C: "The rights and
remedies at law or in equity of any shareholder who desires to object to or to dissent
from any merger or consolidation shall be limited to those prescribed under this section
and such rights and remedies under this section shall be exclusive."
6
Mills v. Penn-Lox Co., (Ohio App. 1940) 36 N.E. (2d) 828. See also 46 M1cH.
L. REV. 562 (1948).
7
15 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed.,§ 7165 (1938); 17 MINN. L. REV. 328
(1933); Weiner, "Payment of Dissenting Shareholders," 27 CoL. L. REV. 547 at 557
(1927).
8 Lattin, "A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes," 3 8 MICH. L. REv. l l 6 5 {l 940).
9
See note 1, supra; In re Universal Pictures, (Del. Ch. 1944) 37 A. {2d) 615.
10
In re Camden Trust Co., 121 N.J.L. 222, 1 A. (2d) 475 (1938).

